This paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the United States using individual tax returns data.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Kuznets' influential hypothesis, income inequality should follow an inverse-U shape along the development process, first rising with industrialization and then declining, as more and more workers join the highproductivity sectors of the economy [Kuznets 1955] . Today, the Kuznets curve is widely held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the United States, with the period of falling inequality observed during the first half of the 20 th century being succeeded by a very sharp reversal of the trend since the 1970s. This does not imply however that Kuznets' hypothesis is no longer of interest. One could indeed argue that what has been happening since the 1970s is just a remake of the previous inverse-U curve: a new industrial revolution has taken place, thereby leading to increasing inequality, and inequality will decline again at some point, as more and more workers benefit from the new innovations.
To cast light on this central issue, we build new homogeneous series on top shares of pre-tax income and wages in the United States covering the 1913 to 1998 period. These new series are based primarily on tax returns data published annually by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) since the income tax was instituted in 1913, as we ll as on the large micro-files of tax returns released by the IRS since 1960.
First, we have constructed annual series of shares of total income accruing to various upper income groups fractiles within the top decile of the income distribution. For each of these fractiles, we also present the shares of each source of income such as wages, business income, and capital income.
Kuznets [1953] Finally, in order to complete our analysis of top capital income earners, we have also used estate tax returns tabulations to construct quasi-annual series (1916 to 1997) of top estates.
Our estimated top shares series display a U-shaped over the century and suggest that a pure Kuznets mechanism cannot account fully for the facts. We find that top capital incomes were severely hit by major shocks in the first part of the century. The post World War I depression and the Great Depression destroyed many businesses and thus reduced significantly top capital incomes.
The wars generated large fiscal shocks, especially in the corporate sector that mechanically reduced distributions to stockholders. We argue that top capital incomes were never able to fully recover from these shocks, probably because of the dynamic effects of progressive taxation on capital accumulation and wealth inequality. We also show that top wage shares were flat from the 1920s until 1940 and dropped precipitously during the war. Top wage shares have started to recover from the World War II shock in the late 1960s, and they are now higher than before World War II. Thus the increase in top income shares in the last three decades is the direct consequence of the surge in top wages. As a result, the composition of income in the top income groups has shifted dramatically over the century: the working rich have now replaced the coupon-clipping rentiers. We argue that both the downturn and the upturn of top wage shares seem too sudden to be accounted for by technical change alone. Our series suggest that other factors, such as changes in labor market institutions, fiscal policy, or more generally social norms regarding pay inequality may ha ve played important roles in the determination of the wage structure. Although our proposed interpretation for the observed trends seems plausible to us, we stress that we cannot prove that progressive taxation and social norms have indeed played the role we attribute to them. In our view, the primary contribution of this paper is to provide new series on income and wage inequality.
One additional motivation for constructing long series is to be able to separate the trends in inequality that are the consequence of real economic change from those that are due to fiscal manipulation. The issue of fiscal manipulation has recently received much attention. Studies analyzing the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) have emphasized that a large part of the response observable in tax returns was due to income shifting between the corporate sector and the individual sector [Slemrod 1996, Gordon and ]. We do not deny that fiscal manipulation can have substantial short-run effects, but we argue that most long -run inequality trends are the consequence of real economic change, and that a short-run perspective might lead to attribute improperly some of these trends to fiscal manipulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our data sources and outlines our estimation methods. In Section III, we present and analyze the trends in top income shares, with particular attention to the issue of top capital incomes. Section IV focuses on trends in top wages shares. Section V offers concluding comments and compares our U.S. findings with comparable series recently constructed for France by Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b , and for the United Kingdom by Atkinson [2001] . All series and complete technical details about our methodology are gathered in appendices of the working paper version of the paper [Piketty and Saez 2001] .
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our estimations rely on tax returns statistics compiled annually by the Internal
Revenue Service since the beginning of the modern U.S. income tax in 1913.
Before 1944, because of large exemptions levels, only a small fraction of individuals had to file tax returns and therefore, by necessity, we must restrict our analysis to the top decile of the income distribution. 4 Because our data are based on tax returns, they do not provide information on the distribution of individual incomes within a tax unit. As a result, all our series are for tax units and not individuals. 5 A tax unit is defined as a married couple living together (with dependents) or a single adult (with dependents), as in the current tax law. The average number of individuals per tax unit decreased over the century but this decrease was roughly uniform across income groups. Therefore, if income were evenly allocated to individuals within tax units, 6 the time series pattern of top shares based on individuals should be very similar to that based on tax units.
Tax units within the top decile form a very heterogeneous group, from the high middle class families deriving most of their income from wages to the superrich living off large fortunes. More precisely, we will see that the composition of income varies substantially by income level within the top decile. Therefore, it is critical to divide the top decile into smaller fractiles. Following Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b , in addition to the top decile (denoted by P90-100), we have constructed series for a number of higher fractiles within the top decile: the top 5 percent (P95-100), the top 1 percent (P99-100), the top 0.5 percent (P99.5 -100), the top 0.1 percent (P99.9-100), and the top 0.01 percent (P99.99-100 Piketty and Saez [2001] why his method produced a downward bias in the levels (though not in the pattern) of top shares. 6 Obviously, income is not earned evenly across individuals within tax units, and, because of increasing female labor force participation, the share of income earned by the primary earner has certainly declined over the century. Therefore, inequality series based on income earned at the individual level would be different. Our tax returns statistics are mute on this issue. We come back to that point when we present our wage estimates.
concrete sense of size of income by fractiles, Table I In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to the treatment of capital gains, we present additional series including capital gains (see below). Details on the methodology and complete series are presented in appendix of Piketty and Saez [2001] . 8 Computing series after individual income taxes is beyond the scope of the present paper but is a necessary step to analyze the redistributive power of the income tax over time, as well as behavioral responses to individual income taxation. 9 This methodology using tax returns to compute the level of top incomes, and using national accounts to compute the total income denominator is standard in historical studies of income inequality. Kuznets [1953] , for instance, adopted this method.
for each fractile into five components: salaries and wages, dividends, interest income, rents and royalties, and business income.
We use the same methodology to compute top wage shares using 1953] was not able to use micro-files to assess possible biases in his estimates due to his methodological assumptions.
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Our method differs from the recent important studies by Poterba [1993, 2000] who derive series of the income share of the top 0.5 percent 13 for 1951 to 1995. They use total income reported on tax returns as their denominator and the total adult population as their base to obtain the number of tax units corresponding to the top fractiles. 14 Their method is simpler than ours but cannot be used for years before 1945 when a small fraction of the population filed tax returns. 10 The most important example is the treatment of capital gains and the percentage of these gains that are included in the statistics tables. 11 These data are known as the Individual Tax Model files. They contain about 100,000 returns per year and largely oversample high incomes, providing a very precise picture of top reported incomes. 12 In particular Kuznets treatment of capital gains produces a downward bias in the level of his top shares. 13 They also present incomplete series for the top 1percent. 14 This method is not fully satisfying for a long-run study as the average number of adults per tax unit has decreased significantly since World War II.
III. TOP INCOME SHARES AND COMPOSITION

A. Trends in Top Income Shares
The basic series of top income shares are presented in Table II . Figure I shows that the income share of the top decile of tax units from 1917 to 1998 is U- In contrast to P90-95 and P95-99, the top percentile (P99-100 in Figure II) underwent enormous fluctuations over the twentieth century. were far wider during the inter-war period than in the decades after the war. [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] and the recovery (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) , capital income increased quickly, but as prices rose, top wages lost in relative terms.
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The negative effect of the wars on top incomes is due in part to the large tax increases enacted to finance them. During both wars, the corporate income tax (as well as the individual income tax) was drastically increased and this reduced mechanically the distributions to stockholders. 17 National Income Accounts show that during World War II, corporate profits surged, but dividend distributions stagnated mostly because of the increase in the corporate tax (who increased from less than 20 percent to over 50 percent) but also because retained earnings increased sharply.
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The decline in top incomes during the first part of the century is even more pronounced for higher fractiles within the top percentile, groups that could be expected to rely more heavily on capital income. As depicted in Figure III , the income share of the top 0.01 percent underwent huge fluctuations during the century. In 1915, the top 0.01 percent earned 400 times more than the average; in 1970, the average top 0.01 percent income was "only" 50 times the average; in 1998, they earned about 250 times the average income.
Our long-term series place the TRA 1986 episode in a longer term perspective. Poterba [1993, 2000] , looking at the top 0.5 percent income shares series ending in 1992 (and 1995 respectively), argued that the surge after TRA86 appeared permanent. However, completing the series up to 1998 shows that the significant increase in the top marginal tax rate, from 31 to 39.6 percent, enacted in 1993 on did not prevent top shares from i ncreasing sharply. 19 From that perspective, looking at Figures II and III, the average increase in top shares from 1985 to 1994 is not significantly higher than the increase from 1994 to 1998 or from 1978 to 1984. As a result, it is possible to argue that TRA86 produced no permanent surge in top income shares, but only a transitory blip. The analysis of top wage shares in Section IV will reinforce this interpretation. In any case, the pattern of top income shares cannot be explained fully by the pattern of top income tax rates.
B. The secular decline of top capital incomes
To demonstrate more conclusively that shocks to capital income were responsible for the large decline of top shares in the first part of the century, we look at the composition of income within the top fractiles. Table III reports the   18 Computing top shares for incomes before corporate taxes by imputing corporate profits corresponding to dividends received is an important task left for future research (see Goldsmith et al. [1954] and Cartter [1954] for such an attempt around the World War II period). 19 Slemrod and Bakija [2000] pointed out that top incomes have surged in recent years. They note that tax payments by taxpayers with AGI above $200,000 increased significantly from 1995 to 1997.
composition of income in top groups for various years from 1916 and 1998. Complete series in Piketty and Saez [2001] show that the sharply increasing pattern of capital income is entirely due to dividends. This evidence confirms that the very large decrease of top incomes observed during the 1914 to 1945 period was to a large extent a capital income phenomenon.
One might also be tempted to interpret the large upturn in top income shares observed since the 1970s as a revival of very high capital incomes, but this is not the case. As shown in Panel B, the income composition pattern has changed drastically between 1929 and 1998. In 1998, the share of wage income has increased significantly for all top groups. Even at the very top, wage income and entrepreneurial income form the vast majority of income. The share of capital income remains small (less than 25%) even for the highest incomes. Therefore, the composition of high incomes at the end of the century is very different from those earlier in the century. Before World War II, the richest americans were overwhelmingly rentiers deriving most of their income from wealth holdings (mainly in the form of dividends). Occupation data by income bracket were published by the IRS in 1916. These data show that, at the very top, the vast majority of taxpayers reported themselves as "Capitalists: Investors and Speculators", while but a small fraction reported themselves as salaried workers (see Piketty and Saez [2001] , Table 3 for details). In contrast, in 1998, more than half of the very top taxpayers derive the major part of their income in the form of wages and salaries. Thus, today, the "working rich" celebrated by Forbes magazine have overtaken the "coupon-clipping rentiers".
The dramatic evolution of the composition of top incomes appears robust and independent from the erratic evolution of capital gains excluded in Figures I to IV. The last two columns of Table II display Most importantly, the secular decline of top capital incomes is due to a decreased concentration of capital income rather than a decline in the share of capital income in the economy as a whole. As displayed on Figure VI Lampman [1962] used these data to construct top 1 percent wealth shares for a few years between 1922 and 1956 using the estate multiplier method. We have constructed quasi-annual series of average levels (in 1998 dollars) of gross estates for various fractiles of decedents aged 25 and above 21 Tax statistics by size of dividends analyzed in Piketty and Saez [2001] confirm a drastic decline of top dividend incomes over the century. In 1998 dollars, top 0.1 percent dividends earners reported on average about $500,000 of dividends in 1927 but less than $240,000 in 1995. 22 The share of dividends in personal income starts declining in 1940 because the corporate income tax increases sharply and permanently, reducing mechanically profits that can be distributed to stockholders. 23 As documented by Fama and French (2000) , a growing fraction of firms never pay dividends (especially in the new technology industries, where firms often make no profit at all), but the point is that total dividend payments continue to grow at the same rate as aggregate corporate profits. 24 In particular, capital gains not realized before death are never reported on income tax returns, but are included in the value of assessed estates.
(ranked by size of gross estate). Panel A in Figure VII [Cooper, 1979] , but academics disagree on the extent of tax evasion [Poterba, 2000] . Furthermore, our results would be invalidated only if the level of tax evasion had increased over time much more for the largest estates (top 0.01 percent) than for large estates.
C. Proposed interpretation: the role of progressive taxation
How can we explain the steep secular decline in capital income concentration? It is easy to understand how the macro-economic shocks of the Great Depression and the fiscal shocks of World War I and World War II have had a negative impact on capital concentration. The difficult question to answer is why large fortunes did not recover from these shocks. The most natural and realistic candidate for an explanation seems to be the creation and the development of the progressive income tax (and of the progressive estate tax and corporate income tax). The very large fortunes that generated the top 0.01 percent incomes observed at the beginning of the century were accumulated during the nineteenth century, at a time where progressive taxes hardly existed and capitalists could dispose of almost all their income to consume and to 25 It is important to keep in mind that estate data reflects the wealth distribution of decedents and thus introduces probably a long lag relative to the current wealth distribution. pre-tax incomes were already severely hit by the prewar shocks, were not willing to reduce their consumption to very low levels. Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b provides simple numerical simulations showing that for a fixed saving rate, introducing substantial capital income taxation has a tremendous effect on the time needed to reconstitute large wealth holdings after negative shocks. Moreover, reduced savings in response to a reduction in the after-tax rate of return on wealth would accelerate the decrease in wealth inequality. Piketty [2001b] shows that in the classic dynastic model with infinite horizon, any positive capital income tax rate above a given high threshold of wealth will eventually eliminate all large wealth holdings without affecting, however, the total capital stock in the economy.
We are not the first to propose progressive taxation as an explanation for the decrease in top shares of income and wealth. Lampman [1962] did as well and Kuznets [1955] explicitly mentioned this mechanism as well as the shocks incurred by capital owners during the 1913 to 1948 period, before presenting his inverted U-shaped curve theory based on technological change. Explanations pointing out that periods of technological revolutions such as the last part of the nineteenth century (industrial revolutions) or the end of the twentieth century (computer revolution) are more favorable to the making of fortunes than other periods might also be relevant. 28 Our results suggest that the decline in income tax progressivity since the 1980s and the projected repeal of the estate tax might produce again in a few decades levels of wealth concentration similar to those of the beginning of the century.
IV. TOP WAGE SHARES
Table IV displays top wage shares from 1927 to 1998 constructed using IRS tabulations by size of wages. There are three caveats to note about these long -term wage inequality series. First, self-employment income is not included in wages and therefore our series focus only on wage income inequality. As selfemployment income has been a decreasing share of labor income over the century, it is conceivable that the pool of wage and salary earners has substantially evolved overtime, and that total labor income inequality series would differ from our wage inequality series. Second and related, large changes in the wage force due to the business cycle and wars might affect our series through compositional effects because we define the top fractiles relative to the total number of tax units with positive wage income. As can be seen in column
(1) of Previous studies have suggested that wage inequality has been gradually decreasing during the first half of the twentieth century (and in particular during the inter-war period) using series of wage ratios between skilled and unskilled occupations (see e.g., Keat [1960] , Williamson and Lindert [1980] ). However, it is important to recognize that a decrease in the ratio of skilled over unskilled wages does not necessarily imply an overall compression of wage income inequality, let alone a reduction in the top wage shares. Given the continuous rise in the numerical importance of white collar jobs, it is natural to expect that the ratios of high-skill wages to low-skill wages would decline over time, even if wage inequality measured in terms of shares of top fractiles of the complete wage distribution does not change. 30 Goldin and Katz [1999] have recently presented new series of white-collar to blue -collar earnings ratios from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1960, and they find that the decrease in pay ratio is (Table IV) . This sharp compression of high wages can fairly easily be explained by the wage controls of the war economy.
The National War Labor Board, established in January 1942 and dissolved in 1945, was responsible for approving all wage changes and made any wage increase illegal without its approval. Exceptions to controls were more frequently granted to employees receiving low wages. 33 Lewellen [1968] has studied the evolution of executive compensation from 1940 to 1963 and his r esults show strikingly that executive salaries were frozen in nominal terms from 1941 to 1945 consistent with the sharp drop in top wage shares that we find.
The surprising fact, however, is that top wage shares did not recover after the war. A partial and short-lived recovery can be seen for all groups, except the very top. But the shares never recover more than one third of the loss incurred during World War II. Moreover, after a short period of stability in the late 1940s, a second phase of compression takes place in the top percentile. This compression phase is longer and most pronounced the higher the fractile. While the fractiles P90-95 and P95-99 hardly suffer from a second compression phase and start recovering just after the war, the top groups shares experience a substantial loss from 1950 to the mid-1960s. The top 0.1 percent share for example declines from 1.6 percent in 1950 to 1.1 percent in 1964 (Table IV) .
The overall drop in top wage shares, although important, is significantly lower than the overall drop in top income shares. 
C. The increase in top shares since the 1970s
Many studies have documented the increase in inequality in the United
States since the 1970s (see e.g., Katz and Murphy [1992] ). Our evidence on top shares is consistent with this evidence. After the World War II compression, the fractiles P90-95 and P95-99 recovered slowly and continuously from the 1950s to the 1990s, and reached the pre-World War II level in the beginning of the 1980s.
As described above, the recovery process for groups within the top percentile did not begin until the 1970s and was much faster. In accordance with results obtained from the March Current Population Surveys Murphy, 1992, Katz and Autor, 1999] , we find that wage inequality, measured by top fractile wage shares, starts to increase in the early 1970s. This is in contrast with results from the May Current Population Surveys [DiNardo et al. 1996] suggesting that the surge in wage inequality is limited to the 1980s.
From 1970 to 1984, the top 1 percent share increased steadily from 5 percent to 7.5 percent ( Figure IX) . From 1986 to 1988, the top shares of wage earners increased sharply, especially at the very top (for example, the top 1 percent share jumps from 7.5 percent to 9.5 percent). This sharp increase was documented by Feenberg and Poterba [1993] and is certainly attributable at least in part to fiscal manipulation following the large top marginal tax rate cuts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (see the discussion in Section III above). However, from 1988 to 1994, top wage shares stay on average constant, 34 but increase very sharply from 1994 to 1998 (the top 1 percent wage share increases from 9 percent to 11 percent). While everybody acknowledges that tax reforms can have large short-term effects on reported incomes due to retiming, there is a 34 One can note the surge in high wages in 1992 and the dip in 1993 and 1994 due to retiming of labor compensation in order to escape the higher rates enacted in 1993 (see Goolsbee [2000] ).
controversial debate on whether changing tax rates can have permanent effects on the level of reported incomes. Looking at long-time series up to 1998 casts doubts on the supply-side interpretation that tax cuts can have lasting effects on reported wages.
Part of the recent increase in top wages is due to the development of stock-options that are reported as wages and salaries on tax returns when they are exercised. Stock-options are compensation for labor services but the fact that they are exercised in a lumpy way may introduce some u pward bias in our annual shares at the very top (top 0.1 percent and above). To cast additional light on this issue and on the timing of the top wage surge, we look at CEO compensation from 1970 to 1999 using the annual surveys published by Forbes magazine since 1971. These data provide the levels and composition of compensation for CEOs in the 800 largest publicly traded US corporations. Thus, by the end of the century, top wage shares are much higher than in the inter-war period. These results confirm that the rise in top income shares and the dramatic shift of income composition at the top documented in Section IV are mainly driven by the surge in top wages during the last three decades. that the ratios P90/P10 and P50/P10 declined sharply during that decade. Our annual series allow us to conclude that most of the decline in top wage shares took place during the key years of the war with no previous decline in inequality before and no recovery afterwards.
D. Proposed interpretation
The compression of wages during the war can be explained by the wage controls of the war economy, but how can we explain the fact that high wage earners did not recover after the wage controls were removed? This evidence cannot be immediate ly reconciled with explanations of the reduction of inequality based solely on technical change as in the famous Kuznets' process. We think that this pattern of evolution of inequality is additional indirect evidence that nonmarket mechanisms such as labor market institutions and social norms regarding inequality may play a role in the setting of compensation at the top. The Great Depression and World War II have without doubt had a profound effect on labor market institutions and more generally on social norms regarding inequality.
During this period, the income tax acquired its modern form, and its top marginal tax rates were set very high, in excess of 80 percent. It is conceivable that such large income tax rates discouraged corporations from increasing top salaries.
During that period, large redistributive programs such as Social Security, and Aid for Families with Dependent Children were initiated. These strongly redistributive policy reforms show that American society's views on income inequality and redistribution greatly shifted from 1930 to 1945. It is also important to note that unionization increased substantially from 1929 to 1950 and that unions have been traditionally in favor of wage compression. In that context, it is perhaps not surprising that the high wages earners who were the most severely hit by the war wage controls were simply not able, because of social, fiscal, and union pressure, to increase their salaries back to the pre-war levels in relative terms.
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Similarly, the huge increase in top wage shares since the 1970s cannot be the sole consequence of technical change. First, the increase is very large, and concentrated among the highest income earners. The fractiles P90-95 and P95-99 experienced a much smaller increase than the very t op shares since the 1970s. Second, such a large change in top wage shares has not taken place in most European countries which experienced the same technical change as the United States. For example, Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b documents no change in top wage shares in the last decades in France. DiNardo et al. [1996] argue that changes in institutions such as the minimum wage and unionization account for a large part of the increase in U.S. wage inequality from 1973 to 1992. As emphasized by Acemoglu et al. [2001] , it is possible that these changes in institutions have been triggered by previous technological changes making it impossible to sustain previous labor market arrangements. 36 It seems unlikely, however, that changes in unionization or the minimum wage can explain the surge in very top wages. The marginal product of top executives in large corporations is notoriously difficult to estimate, and executive pay is probably determined to a significant extent by herd behavior. Changing social norms regarding inequality and the acceptability of very high wages might partly explain the rise in U.S. top wage shares observed since the 1970s.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998. Perhaps surprisingly, nobody had tried to extend the pioneering work of Kuznets [1953] to more recent years. Moreover, important wage income statistics from tax returns had never been exploited 35 Emphasizing the role of social norms and unionization is of course not new and has been pointed out as important elements explaining the wage compression of the 1940s and 1950s by several studies [Brownlee 1977 , Goldin and Margo 1992 , and Goldin and Katz 1999 . Moreover, as emphasized by Goldin and Margo [1992] and Goldin and Katz [1999] , it is possible that the large increase in the supply of college graduates contributed to make the drop in top wage shares persistent.
before. The large shocks that capital owners experienced during the Great Depression and World War II seem to have had a permanent effect: top capital incomes are still lower in the late 1990s than before World War I. We have tentatively suggested that steep progressive taxation, by reducing the rate of wealth accumulation, has prevented the large fortunes to recover fully yet from these shocks. The evidence for wage series shows that top wage shares were flat before World War II and dropped precipitously during the war. Top wage shares have started recovering from this shock only since the 1970s but are now higher than before World War II.
To what extent is the U.S. experience representative of other developed countries' long run inequality dynamics? Existing inequality series are unfortunately very scarce and incomplete for most countries, 37 and it is therefore very difficult to provide a fully satisfactory answer to this question. However, it is interesting to compare the U.S. top income share series with comparable series recently constructed for France by Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b , and for the United Kingdom by Atkinson [2001] . There are important similarities between the American, French, and British pattern of the top 0.1 percent income share displayed on Figure XII . 38 In all three countries, top income shares fell considerably during the 1914 to 1945 period, and they were never able to come back to the very high levels observed at the eve of World War I. It is plausible to think that in all three countries, top capital incomes have been hit by the depression and wars shocks of the first part of the century and could not recover because of the dynamic effects of progressive taxation on capital. Piketty [2001a] also shows that in France, there was no spontaneous decline of top wage shares before World War II. In France, top wage shares declined during World War I, but they quickly recovered during the 1920s and were stable until World War II.
Some important differences need however to be emphasized. First, the shock of World War II was more pronounced in France and in the United 36 See also Acemoglu [2002] . 37 See Lindert [2000] and Morrisson [2000] for recent surveys.
Kingdom than in the United States. This is consistent with the fact that capital owners suffered from physical capital losses during the war in Europe, while there was no destruction on U.S. soil. 39 Second, the World War II wage compression was very short-lived in France, while it had long lasting effects in the United States. In France, wage inequality, measured both in terms of top wage shares and in terms of inter-decile ratios appears to have been extremely stable over the course of the twentieth century. The U.S. history of wage inequality looks very different: the war compression had long-lasting effects, and then wage inequality increased considerably since the 1970s, which explains the U.S. upturn of top income shares since the 1970s. 40 The fact that France and the United States display such diverging trends is consistent with our interpretation that technical change alone cannot account for the U.S. increase in inequality. 
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38 Due to very high exemption thresholds in the United Kingdom prior to World War II, Atkinson was not able to compute top decile or even top percentile series covering the entire century (only the top 0.1% and higher fractiles series are available for the entire century for all three countries). 39 Estate tax data also show that the fall in top estates was substantially larger in France (see Piketty [2001a Piketty [ , 2001b ). 40 The United Kingdom also experienced an increase in top shares in the last two decades but much more modest than in the United States. Notes: Fractiles defined by size of total income (excluding capital gains). For each fractile, the first three columns (summing to 100%) give the percentage of wage income (wages and salaries), entrepreneurial income (self-employment income, partnership income, and small business income), and capital income (dividends, interest, and rents) in total income (excluding capital gains).
The fourth column displays the extra percentage of income (defined excluding capital gains) obtained by each of these fractiles (defined again by total income excluding capital gains) from capital gains. Details on methodology are presented in Appendix A of Piketty and Saez (2001) .
Source: Computations based on Individual Income Statistics and reported in Tables A7 and A8 , various rows in Piketty and Saez (2001) . Piketty and Saez (2001) and complete series reported in Tables B1 and B2 .
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